

May Hairston

I N S T R U C T I O N

The following report on our Guerilla School covers most instructions given and also lists the majority of men graduated.

The school was under the direction of Capt. James Mantz and the success of his efforts may be observed in the results of these trained Chinese on operations.

Total number of students graduated was 756. Each class, when possible, had a class book and was also given a special guerilla pin, listing him as a Guerilla Soldier of the TUNGAN-LINGLING-KIYANG Self Protective Area.

HEADQUARTERS
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
CHINA THEATER
APO 627

26 August 1945

SUBJECT: American Guerilla Instruction Report

TO : Chief SO Branch, OSS/CT, APO 627

1. Location - Kiyang, Hunan Province, China
Chinese Unit - Kiyang-Tungan Self Protective Area
commanded by Lt. General Chiang Fu Sheng
American Unit - Team #15 S.O. Code Elephant
commanded by W.C. Hanna, Capt. F.A.
Inclusive Dates - 15 June to 10 August 1945
Instructors - American Chinese

Capt. Mantz (weapons)	Capt. Lee (School C.O.)
Lt. Pelfrey (demolition)	Capt. May
Cpl. Wing (interpreter)	Mr. Ping (interpreter)
Cpl. Mar (interpreter)	

CLASS I

The following is the completed schedule which followed two months of Chinese mountain guerilla training. Air supply and ordnance on hand were determining factors in subject matter taught. There were few American weapons; 90% of guerilla weapons were Japanese. Students were well disciplined, were mechanically minded, and learned exceptionally fast.

Number of students: 100 (50 officers and 50 NCO's)

Two classes per day - 50 per class

<u>Date</u>	Instructors Class - Pelfrey, Mar	Instructors Class - Mantz, Wing
15 June	1903 Rifle	.45 pistol
16 June	1903 Rifle	.45 pistol
17 June	No class	No class
18 June	Chinese tactics Americans at Air Drop	Chinese tactics
19 June	1903-M1 Rifle (range)	.45 pistol (range) .22 silencer demonstration
20 June	Combined classes all day. (a) Rocket and grenade launcher comparison (b) .03 Grenade launcher instruction and firing (c) WP and fragmentation grenade instruction and practical work.	

<u>Date</u>	Instr Class - Pelfrey, Mar	Instr Class - Mantz, Wing
21 June	Chinese classes Americans - compulsory political Kanpei Party	
22 June	Bren .303	.30 LMG
23 June	Bren .303	.30 LMG
24 June	(Sunday) Special all day classes Bren and LMG for 40 guerillas who were on active operations and could attend class only one day.	
25 June	Bren .303 (range)	.30 LMG (range)
26 June	An additional 38 Military Police Unit joined our classes, but a current Nip threat to our mountain necessitated various Regiments recalling 36 students. No classes, cleaned new carbines and O3's.	
27 June	Demolition - simple charges	Carbine .30 brief functioning and demonstration.
28 June	Incendiaries, sabotage	.45 TSMG brief functioning and firing.

SPECIAL CLASS I

- (1) On 26, 27, 28 June, Capt. W.C. Hanna held a special demolition and sabotage class.
- (2) Special guerillas from 2nd Regiment (near RR) were students.
- (3) Class was set up to point toward a large scale demolition operation on Jap railroad between Hungchiao and Lengshihtang, a distance of 80 kilos between the larger cities of Kiyang and Hengyang.
- (4) Each guerilla was trained specifically for his definite job.
- (5) Approximately 220 charges were built. 200 standard rail bursting charges and 20 special charges for train, bridges and special areas.

CLASS II

- (1) 200 students reported 11 July for a two week course.
- (2) Two classes in Bren and LMG were taught when all students were called into action.
- (3) Evacuation - 13th July when elements of Jap 7th Div (Hengyang) and 13 Div (near Kweilin)

CLASS III

Location - small mountain valley, 10 miles from Wenminpu - 290° azimuth.
 Students - Self-protective area guerillas from regiments north of road and railroad.
 Instructors - Same except for Lt. Hairston who joined Elephant 26 July.
 Courses - Set up in two sections - one demolition and one weapons.

SECTION #I

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Instructor</u>	<u>27 July</u>	<u>Students</u>	<u>Notes</u>
1903 Rifle	Hairston		110	65 o's, 45 NCO's
.30 carbine	Mantz		110	" "

SECTION #1

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Instructor</u>		<u>Students</u>	<u>Notes</u>
		<u>28 July</u>		
1903 Rifle	Hairston		110	65 O's, 45 NCO's
.30 carbine	Mantz		110	" "

29 July

Hanna, Mantz, Hairston prepared 84 TNT rail charges, and 30 prima cord commo cutting charges for scheduled railroad operation 4 August.

30 July

1903 (range)	Hairston		110	7 rds each
.30 carbine (range)	Mantz		110	9 rds each

31 July

2.36 rocket launchers	Hairston Mantz		121	11 special
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(all day class and instruction. Trained a special 11 squad who fired 8 rounds)

1 August

Hand grenades	Hairston, Mantz		110	
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(all day class, practical work, fragmentation and WP, improvised TNT rail and TNT expended cartridges, grenades, grenade booby traps, delay action time pencil grenades)

2 August

.45 pistol	Hairston		110	No range work.
.45 TSMG	Mantz		110	No ammunition

3 August

.30 carbine (30)	Mantz, Hairston		110	
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1903 carbine (40)				
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(special all day class, cleaning and operation)

4 August

Bren .303	Mantz, Hairston, Pelfrey		110	
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(all day instruction and demonstration including range work).

5, 6, 7, 8 August

Chinese instruction

CLASS IV

A three day class was rapidly set up for best utilization of American weapons from a recent air drop. Again troops 240 arrived at Headquarters from area near Wenminpu - a Nip stronghold.

Three separate classes were held daily and students were assigned in groups for respective special weapons, ie, (20) students for Bren; (15) for bazooka, etc.

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Instructor</u>		<u>Students</u>	<u>Notes</u>
		<u>6 August</u>		
Bren	Pelfrey		20	Only 180 of 240 reported.
1903	Hairston		160	
carbine	Mantz		160	

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Instructor</u>		<u>Students</u>	<u>Notes</u>
		<u>7 August</u>		
Bren (range) (a.m.)	Pelfrey		20	Only familiar- ization firing.
Bazooka (range) (p.m.)	Hairston		15	
1903 rifle (range)	Hairston		205	
.30 carbine (range)	Mantz		205	
		<u>8 August</u>		
Bren	Pelfrey		20	Review for men assigned Ameri- can weapons.
Bazooka	Pelfrey		15	
1903 rifle	Hairston		40	
Carbine	Mantz		30	

Note: Class V never materialized - cessation of hostilities.

SPECIAL CLASS #2

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Instructor</u>		<u>Students</u>	<u>Notes</u>
		<u>27 July</u>		
Demolition	Pelfrey		80	Special Unit
		<u>28 July</u>		
Demolition	Pelfrey		80	Special Unit
		<u>29 July</u>		
Demolition	Pelfrey		80	Special Unit
	(20 additional students - one day course)			
		<u>30 July</u>		
Railroad & demo	Hanna		80	For 4th August operation
Briefing	Pelfrey			

SPECIAL CLASS #3

		<u>31 July</u>		
81 mm mortar	Hanna, Pelfrey		11	Special squad
		<u>1 August</u>		
81 mm mortar (range)	Pelfrey		11	

SPECIAL CLASS #4

		<u>2 August</u>		
Demo, incendiary sabotage, devices	Hanna		40	
		<u>3 August</u>		
Demo, incendiary sabotage, devices	Hanna		40	

INTRODUCTION

As Team Commander of S.O. Team Elephant I have been ordered to write a report of our operational activities.

I shall attempt to carry out the order on the following pages to the best of my ability. Should any question arise in the minds of those who review this report as to its authenticity I wish to remind them that it is written under direct order and not personal desires.

What the reader thinks will in no way influence the feeling of satisfaction of the team members concerned.

Best then, it is, that the report not even be read.

2. PREPARATIONS

Team #15 code name Elephant was formed at Kunming, China on May 25, 1945. Members of the team were Capt. W.G. Hanna Jr. CO; Capt J.F. Mantz, Ex; 1st Lt Reed Pelfrey, Asst Ex; M/Sgts Robert Baird and Howard Palmer, radio and demolition experts and Epls George Wing and Kenneth Mar as interpreters. Three months later 1st Lt Ray Harston joined the team in the field.

The mission of Elephant was to proceed to the area east of the Hengyang-Kweilin Railroad in the vicinity of Kiyang where we were primarily to disrupt the enemy transportation communication lines and harrass their movements; secondly to transmit intelligence to base. The original plan was to have Elephant as a net control station for four other teams to facilitate the transmission of traffic to base. This plan was cancelled while we were in the field.

The team left Kunming on April 11 after two weeks of team training; on April 22 we arrived at Chihkiang which was our base headquarters.

On the 25th of April we were given a 10 day mission of trail reconnaissance in the area south of Chihkiang with the purpose of selective defensive positions which might be used to halt the Japs in their drive which was in progress at that time. A report was turned in on our observations when we returned to base on May 4.

From the 4th of May to the 13th we prepared for our march to Kiyang and on May 14th we departed taking with us a minimum of equipment to facilitate movement. The march lasted 25 days and was prolonged by continual movement through enemy occupied territory. Nine days were spent in Wukang while we awaited dispersal of the enemy in that area and the return of our scouts.

For over half the distance of our march we were accompanied by team Dormouse since movement was facilitated by having to be supplied with only a single military escort from the 4th War Area Headquarters.

Only once during the trip did we directly contact the enemy. This occurred while crossing the railroad. A Jap patrol surprised our party but no casualties were suffered. Some personal equipment was lost and several hours spent reorganizing.

On June 8th we arrived at our destination which we determined by word stating the fact that guerilla leader General Chiang Fu Seng was there. Location was 5 miles northeast of Kiyang on top of the highest mountain peak. In the area the peak was known as Tia Pai Feng or White Mountain. News travels fast in China, consequently our arrival was no surprise to the General.

First in order then, was to tell him the reason for our coming and also to present a letter of introduction written by General Wu, CO of the 4th War Area. This letter was requested by me and in actuality was rather questionable as to its authenticity for it stated we were directly under orders from Gen. Wedemeyer and the Generalissimo. General Chiang therefore was very cooperative even before we came to any understanding.

We began our discussion on policy which briefly was to harrass the Japs continually in every manner possible. We could produce limited supplies for the operations and would like to instruct and command the men who were to use our material.

To this he agreed whole heartedly. We requested that within a short period of time 1,000 men be put at our disposal. The idea of this being to have enough guerillas to wage combined operations simultaneously to divert attacks on one locality. Again he concurred and even offered more.

His suggestions were that in the area which he commanded, the Tungan-Lingling-Kiyang area 15,000 men could be called upon for assistance. Of these, 10,000 were in a skeletonized military organization under him. This guerilla army was divided into 28 regiments throughout the area, each averaging 300 men. Of these, approx. 3,000 were armed with Jap rifles and pistols with 10 rds. per gun average. The other weapons were 6,000 captured and stolen Chinese rifles taken from the Japs. Ammunition was the same. Military experience for the men was negligible. His desire was that we plan and conduct the special operations and train any number of men we desired. Anything we needed he would supply and man power was of no consequence. We were to conduct all operations possible with only one aim in mind: To destroy the enemy.

Upon agreement to these points by the General and Elephant, we were given quarters at the main Hq. After resting the remainder of that day, and after receiving two Jap heads as a welcoming gift, we started to work the next day by finding a location for our school and selecting a drop ground which was called Frances.

The school was three miles from Headquarters down in a deep valley where all natural training aids were available. Classes began in two days and our own personal weapons were used for instruction in addition to the small amount of equipment which we had transported with us.

Capt Mantz was in charge of the school. Lt Pelfrey was his assistant and Cpls. Mar and Wing acted as instructor interpreters. We were ably assisted by Chinese Major Lee and Capt. Mai. More detailed information on the school may be found in the chapter on training.

The day after our arrival the drop ground was selected as a matter of necessity. It was chosen in the most accessible spot, directly on the highest mountain ridge in the area. This location could be observed by the Japs from every direction, a point to our advantage. For the Japs counted the chutes in every drop and imagined us to be receiving more American personnel. By the time of our departure, they estimated at least 200 Americans were with us.

Upon selection of the D.Z. we immediately sent for supplies and during the interim, school began and plans were drawn at the Headquarters as to definite operations.

We ordered that a more active campaign begin immediately against the Jap movement through the area.

We asked for daily intelligence reports and received them and, in addition, selected a specially trained intelligence man from Chungking, Mr. Lu, to be our SI chief.

Believing that we were in the most strategic area of the Hengyang-Kweilin corridor since we were in a Jap encirclement, diameter of 12 miles and had access to the highway, railroad and river we were ready to begin operations.

Hqs. was established on Tai Pai Feng where Sgts Baird and Palmer had the commo center and the school was 3 miles away under Capt. Mahtz.

We only lacked supplies. In five days our first drop arrived.

3. OPERATIONS

Our operations from June 10th to the cessation of hostilities were of typical SO nature. Team Elephant accounted for the following during this period:

- 764 Japs (including prisoners and puppets) killed
- 99 Japs wounded
- 501 Rails destroyed
 - 3 Locomotive engines derailed
 - 5 Coaches destroyed
- 22 Trucks destroyed
- 5 Bridges blown
- 70 Brls gas burned
- 1 Mile tel wire blown
- 1400 Lbs telephone wire captured
- 20 Telephone line cuts (5 wire)
- 6 Jap houses and warehouses burned
- 1 Ferry burned
- 200 50-lb bombs destroyed
- 1 Airfield blown

Our intelligence to the air corps resulted in strikes in which 257 Japs were killed by them, included in which were artillery embacements at Kiyang and 10 tons of rice at Kweiyangshih which we saw destroyed.

After the cessation of hostilities there were more than 20 more trucks destroyed and over 150 Japs killed. In our area the Japs refused to surrender and so protective measures had to be taken. These casualties I did not record with Headquarters.

At this time our sabotage and ambush systems had just been thoroughly organized and completed. We were at last ready to operate as we initially desired.

During this period we constructed one and one half air strips and in classes graduated 756 students.

With assistance from the MO Branch of OSS we distributed special propaganda prepared for us by Lt Sturgis. The results were excellent and Lt Sturgis is to be commended.

Regarding operations proper, our actions were kept at a minimum by a continual lack of supplies from Headquarters. Although we received seven planes of cargo this amount was disgustingly insufficient. On the other hand the timely delivery of each load and the excellent support lent to all SO Teams under the outstanding command of Major John Summers did much to ease the disappointment of field teams. The few accomplishments of Elephant we credit entirely to him.

It was planned to arm 125 specialists in ambush work and divided them into five teams. These men were trained, but not until the last repeat last week of the war did we receive enough weapons for such schemes. Until that time we operated with only 60 American weapons. Two thirds of our weapons arrived in the last two drops one week before peace. Headquarters knew we had 15,000 men and yet they refused to give us arms.

Through our area, over 200,000 Japs evacuated. Our position was so ideal that with a V.F.H. radio to direct bombers and fighters to targets, the casualties would have been astronomical. This radio was requested immediately upon our arrival in the area. Not until 2½ months later when we were in a relatively inactive area by comparison was this radio delivered, and delivered incomplete with two generators instead of a stays box and antenna mast. This, too, came one week before terms were reached.

I requested the use of two L-5 planes to operate from our field. We intended to mount bazookas on these and use them to destroy convoys and Jap Headquarters by using our fire power and improvised bombs. Headquarters Kunming ignored the message completely.

On August the fourth our plans were to destroy 1,000 rails between Tungan and Hengyang and to blow 750 telephone poles and cut the wires in 750 places. Headquarters knew this in advance and our men were trained and waiting and yet we received no supplies for the job.

Last but not least, I respect my commission and also rank in the American Army, but I sincerely doubt the value of the order placing Major Thomas West in charge of SO teams in the Hengyang Changsha area. Major West has undoubtedly established himself as an SI expert but as an SO commander his orders and motives were most confusing. His messages were ambiguous, incoherent and incomplete.

The ambitions of all SO teams in the Hengyang area were to take the city of Hengyang from the Japs. Major West killed this ambition by ordering teams to await his orders to enter the city. These orders were received only by asking and not given until after an OG team had entered the town. This was a sad disappointment to all men who had operated so long in that area.

A condensed report on operations follows. In no way is it complete for there will be no mention whatsoever of most minor instances. For questions which arise I refer the reader to our messages and the attached copies of citations. For proof, I direct the reader to the area concerned to question those who suffered and participated.

In all operations, those which proved the most profitable with a minimum of losses were sabotage and ambush. When the guerilla controls the element of surprise, he gives a good account of himself. On the defense he is fair, but on the

offense his first thought is self preservation and, consequently, orders are of no value. This can be attributed to his lack of military training and therefore he does not know the implications involved in failure to obey orders.

On June 11 the first results of our talks with the General were had. Five Japs were killed at Kweiyangshih, 8 miles east of our headquarters. These were results of sniping at the Japs from outside the town, and were a forerunner of what was to happen in all towns within the area. Our arrival seemed to fire the enthusiasm of the guerrillas and each regimental CO wished to make a record for himself. We met many of those personally for this reason. And to keep up this enthusiasm we selected students from different groups stationed in most important areas. Realizing that a few from each would be able to instruct others. For the same reasons we distributed our few weapons to the most tactically located groups with the stipulation that all arms and men would return immediately upon our need for operations.

The first drop arrived on June 13, so immediate plans were laid for a railroad job of derailing the engine in addition to blowing the small airfield at Tsia Chia Pu between Lingling and Lichiaping. Both jobs were carried out under the direction of a Chungking agent, Capt. Yi, whom we made our demo assistant. The airfield was blown on the 17th and damaged to where two weeks were required to repair it. 500 lbs. of TNT were used. 55 barrels of gas, 2 tanks and a garage were burned and 200 50 lb. bombs were blown up.

The town of Kweiyangshih was the major point of attack during June since it was most accessible and an important river town. A small attack was planned on the town and, after the first drop, carried out resulting in losses of 38 Japs.

On the night of the 23rd, a troop train was blown with the employment of a maximum of TNT for the purpose of inflicting heavy casualties. Capt. Yi led the mission and accounted for derailing the engine, setting fire to the coaches and killing 78 Japs with his small party of 30 men. The majority of casualties were from the explosion proper. The action took place at Code 4101-0966-1579, 25 kilo NE Kiyang. Nine of our men were lost.

During the period from the 11th to the 23rd, we requested Very pistols to signal the Air Corps for night bombing of Kiyang targets. The Air Corps agreed, but we received no pistols. Shortly after this the parts factory there moved out to Hengyang.

At this time we heard Japs had been pursuing us on our march in, and at Puyunchiao they had attacked the town immediately after our departure while looking for us. They burnt 10 houses as reprisals, killed seven and wounded nine guerrillas. 11 Japs were killed.

Our men were still skirmishing at Kweiyangshih and on the 13th, nine of the enemy were killed. The next day, eight more were killed.

At this time we requested special propaganda be dropped in our area, stamped with the General's name. This was not dropped but was delivered to us in our next supply load. This we distributed and results were effective, two Japs surrendered and much dissension resulted.

To condense the report, Japs continued to be killed in the Kweiyangshih area all month. Total casualties came to 246 altogether for the month in all the areas. During the latter part of the month our own students were in these fights with our weapons.

On the 17th, the Air Corps bombed Kiyang and we reported casualties and pontoon bridge destruction to them. This procedure of reporting bombing results was followed throughout our entire mission.

On the 17th, we received a supply drop. Fighter escort killed 40 Japs in Kiyang. Propaganda was received on this drop and distributed to Lingling, Kiyang and Hengyang, as was done with all future propaganda.

On the 20th, we sent back info on first prisoner, a practice which we kept up from then on. Also we asked Air Corps to bomb 65 ton Jap rice target in Kweiyangshih. This they did but destroyed only 10 tons. Had planned to coordinate attack with bombing but failed, for Air Corps failed to come at requested times. We had 250 men there and even so in three days, over 75 Japs had been killed.

Our intelligence now said that on the 18th the Japs had attacked Huan Tu Pu, 30 kilos north of Kiyang where they heard we were. They demanded our 7th Regimental CO to turn us over. Upon refusal they attacked, killing a Battalion CO and his executive, in addition to five of our soldiers. The Regimental CO's son was captured but later returned through negotiations, by a Puppet. The Japs burnt 10 houses and destroyed much rice, although they lost 31 men.

At this time we informed Air Corps of change in Jap route of movement to the north, the purpose of which was to avoid air attack. The new route went to our south, toward Leiyang, then Chaling to Changsha.

Unfortunately at this time Capt. Mantz contracted malaria and for this reason and the fact that we needed more men for operations and the school, we requested reinforcements which never came.

On the 26th we received more supplies consisting of demo as did the others. Our requests had been for weapons. The first of these was for 250 carbines and 250 1903 rifles. We received 20 of each!

On the 27th, we began work on top of the highest mountain ridge in the area for an L-5 strip. 300 men were employed and the actual mountain hog back ridge was to be removed. Work lasted 3 weeks here, with different team members supervising the demo work involved. Fate prevented the completion of the field since we were ultimately forced to evacuate.

On this day we received the first word of the success of our sabotage men. They had burnt two trucks in Kiyang with incendiaries and also killed both drivers. On the same day our men killed 5 Japs north of Kiyang and wounded eight more. On this day, the General received a note from the Kiyang Japs ordering him to surrender us or suffer consequences. The note was ignored and we mined the mountain trails leading to our headquarters.

At this time our classes were in full swing and students were being given definite assignments in their Regts. on graduation. Now we began planning for a July 4th railroad demo job. Most of our enthusiasm over the results of our guerillas was dampened at the sad news of Capt. Blackwell's and Lt. Allen's misfortune.

We offered 5,000,000 Yuan for their return to us by any means or any person. We contacted the 9th War Area CO, also the General commanding intelligence in that area in addition to Gen. Tsia Lee's agents. All efforts proved in vain.

On the 30th, we sent the first group of 150 men out for our demo job which was to be within the limits of Lengshantang and Hungchiao, a distance of 80 kilos. Three more groups followed and we accompanied the one which was to blow the train. There was a possibility of destroying 340 rails but only 280 were actually damaged in addition to one train being derailed. Two coaches were destroyed and a small bridge blown, 1 mile north of Pai Ti Shih. The train was derailed and not blown because of failure to arrive at tracks at the estimated time. Rainy weather slowed the approach march, so the actual main engine charges destroyed only rails, 16 in all.

It was on this operation that Cpl. Mar was wounded. He showed courage and great fortitude by withdrawing from the area without assistance. Other team members showed up well and the students again proved their capabilities in our celebration of the Fourth of July.

We had 30 guerillas with us as an ambush and security group. Realizing the proximity of the enemy patrols to our objective, we dispatched flank guards with orders to refrain from combat and to fire only in case of saving their own lives.

As we anticipated, we were discovered by a small patrol. While laying the charges, there was a limited exchange of fire but results were not serious, for we completed the operation and withdrew. Almost immediately, the Jap garrisons at Pai Ti Shih and Lichiaping were notified of our operation. Approximately 200 of the enemy were dispatched to intercept us on our return to headquarters. By a continual 14 hour march we managed to keep ahead of these troops, arriving at Tai Pai Feng safely.

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During the month's operations we had come to appreciate the location of our headquarters for it was the axis of the Jap withdrawal, over 50,000 Japs having moved north along this line. These troops were elements of the 3rd, 13th, 34th, 37th and 58th Divisions and the numbers established the fact of definite withdrawal from the corridor.

It was imperative we remain in the area, so we again requested a VHF radio that we might have aerial support. The enemy had different ideas, for our railroad operation had given us official recognition. They immediately began offensive actions against us, and from this time on there were always from one to three thousand of the enemy with the assignment of stifling our operations or disposing of us. 500,000 CN was offered for the capture or death of any American in our group. Three days later, two plain clothes men were captured in the vicinity of our school. Their heads were given to us as a personal present.

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Before our July 4th operations, we realized the value of diversionary attacks in our area, so an order was given to increase harrassing on the 2nd. Eleven Japs were killed at Pai Ti Shih, a ferry was burned at Kiyang and 2 miles N.E. of Kiyang, a small Jap detachment was attacked--55 were killed to our losses of 14. South of Lingling, an ambush on a small group of infantry resulted in 7 casualties. These diversions undoubtedly assisted in the success of our rail demo.

Operations were successful and we could have profitably received more personnel. We asked Headquarters for an OG team commanded by Capt. Mills Brandeis but received no reply. We also requested supplies to again blow the air field north of Lingling. Headquarters said to leave the field as it was for advancing (?) Chinese.

On the 18th, we received a drop but no arms. On the 7th, the Japs began pushing on our mountain headquarters from the south. Our classes were discontinued and students used to reinforce our defense. Our men killed 35 Japs and wounded several in these skirmishes. Due to our knowledge of the terrain, guerilla losses were at a minimum - 6 in all. A few weapons were captured. We were at this time standing by for a drop but had to sacrifice deployment of troops to guard the field. We informed headquarters of this situation, insisting on arms and more personnel.

At this time our intelligence said 500 Jap plain clothes men were moving into our area in disguises as merchants. Fortunately we suffered little from their efforts.

While awaiting the drop, all team members joined our defense forces to help plan and conduct the fighting against the Japs. On different days different men participated as two teams. They were all responsible for effective mortar fire which resulted in the death of at least 30 Japs. Their work did much to temporarily halt the Jap drive on our positions. A group of 60 guerillas, working with Capt. Mentz, and Lt. Pelfrey, surprised a Jap entrenchment containing a heavy machine gun. Their courage in the attack was commendable, for the Japs withdrew from the crest under a bayonet and sword attack by the guerillas. Seven Japs were killed and 12 of our men.

The situation looked encouraging by our results, so we planned for another far-reaching rail demo operation north of Hengyang. This, however, did not materialize since we had to move shortly.

To obtain more ammo at this time, we wired Hq to obtain Chinese ammo from their dump at Chihkiang. All the Chinese gave in reply were promises.

On the 12th, the skirmishes began to increase in frequency and were in progress on three sides. We sent an urgent message requesting ammo and gave the location of Japs to Air Corps hoping they would strafe. On that afternoon, enemy mortar fire fell uncomfortably close to our school. All Chinese began to evacuate. At 3:00 AM on Friday the 13th, news came that Japs were moving in force on us.

We immediately cancelled the drop and prepared to evacuate, for it was impossible to exist under the far superior fire power of mortars and machine guns of the attacking forces.

Our troops numbering 1,000, could not stop the estimated 5,000 enemy (later proven to be 3,000 men of the 13th Division)

Orders were for one hundred and fifty to accompany us while others were to remain in the area to harrass the enemy as the situation offered.

At this point our estimated casualties were 80. Wounded were hidden and at 10:00 AM the entire Hq moved north, a surprise to the enemy for our most obvious alternative position was to the south in other mountains. This move undoubtedly saved a great deal of fighting and several lives, for the Japs had established themselves to prevent such a move. Cpl. Wing remained behind with me to blow up surplus supplies which were impossible to take with us. These consisted of TNT, devices, food, parachutes, and .45 cal ammo. The destruction was successful and we moved out under enemy fire to join Headquarters group. The destruction was at 10:25 and by 11:30 the Japs were in our headquarters.

At the school, Lt. Pelfrey and Cpl. Mar destroyed supplies and moved northwest as a rear and flank defense for us with another group of 50 guerillas. In this movement we became separated and were apart for three days when forces were joined 15 miles north of the railroad at Wang Tu Pu.

I might add at this point that we had previously requested heavy mortars for such an emergency. These were never received.

During our fight and withdrawal our estimated losses were 110 to 250 for the enemy although heavy reprisals in the forms of fires and stealing were instigated on their part.

All homes surrounding our Headquarters and school were burned and the General's home was burned and blown. Several Chinese were murdered.

General Chiang left his wife and young son to a special guard which was to move them south across the river. He considered it his duty to accompany us and personally command the Chinese with our group which now numbered 250 in size, including many civilians. Our procession was a pitiful sight with many old people and young wives carrying tiny babies.

We marched for 5 hours, then rested in a secluded little town until dark. While resting we heard our C-47 overhead with emergency supplies, a load which I later learned had been listed, supplied, and loaded for us in two hours. Unfortunately we were in no position to receive their aid.

Our rear guard did excellent work in employing the enemy, thereby insuring our movement. Two thousand of the Japs were held on and around the mountain while approximately 1,000 were searching for us. By the application of our intelligence brought in hourly, we managed to keep ahead of the Japanese so that only our rear guard was under fire.

Our only other engagement was a small skirmish on the railroad and a be-guiled accidental meeting with a foraging patrol.

Our march then to a new Hq was physical torture beyond description covering 24 hours practically non-stop.

During the entire period of attack upon our Headquarters, Capt. Mantz suffered from malaria and dysentery; consequently at the time of our forced movement his physical condition was appalling. In spite of this fact he forced himself to keep moving, for falling behind would have critically endangered the lives of all. He is to be commended.

General Chiang also made a great sacrifice in leaving his wife and son to accompany us. For two weeks we believed them dead but finally learned of their whereabouts. The news was as welcome to us as to the General and events pertaining to their escape were miraculous.

We continued our march, stopping only long enough to obtain water then move on. At 4:00 AM on the 14th we stopped for the last time before crossing the road. The group was divided in two parts. First, a party composing the essential equipment such as radios and personal belongings, and then the group of civilians and our less important materials.

The first party numbered 100 and met with the only opposition in crossing. Half way across the road and railroad a convoy suddenly topped a hill and threw light upon the column. The coolies were frightened and fled, discarding all loads. The confusion resulted in the alerting of a patrol of approximately 25 Japs who moved in on the scattered load under little opposition from our guards. In the darkness it was impossible to recognize who was in our group. Unfortunately part of our radio was found unknown to all of us but Sgt. Palmer. Before long we reorganized and moved on slowly. Sgt. Palmer was missing, so we waited. Within an hour he overtook us, bringing with him the missing radio parts. He had taken 20 guerillas and found the Japs with the radio. By surprising them and with our new automatic weapons, he managed to inflict casualties on them and also frighten the others away. Without his initiative, we should have lost communications with base.

We sent a large part of our group to Wong Tu Pu and rested a short time. Also a message was sent back to the second party to hide their equipment and await for the following night to cross. This was done, and equipment came straggling in for one week.

As we moved forward, we encountered a small foraging party but after observing our size they moved off quickly with no interference. Actually we were in no shape to fight.

We rested that night and next day, awaiting Lt. Pelfrey's and Lt. Mar's arrival. At noon they reaches us much the worse for wear. Their crossing was more fortunate than ours, for they had saved more equipment.

The next 4 days were spent looking for a new headquarters which was located 9 miles northeast of Wenmingpu. We located a drop ground on the 20th and informed headquarters, also informing them that our radio was worn out. It was impossible to send intelligence at this time.

Our plans were to start our school immediately on the 23rd. On the 26th all regimental commanders were to come to headquarters to talk over a more active policy and also for the purpose of planning revenge.

On the 16th, our men at Tai Pai Feng accounted for 16 more Japs and fired one truck with 150 gal. gas. To continue these operations, we asked again for Chinese ammo without avail.

We informed Hq of plans for a large scale demo job on a railroad for August 4th and asked for supplies. Also a location for an air strip was selected and work begun.

Before our evacuation, we had sent explosives to different areas along the roads. This was utilized and on the nights of the 17th and 18th two bridges and one truck were blown. One Jap major and one Lt., plus a driver were killed. The action occurred at Chilunehieh, and at 12 kilos south of Hengyang 1400 lbs. of telephone wire were captured and a puppet taken prisoner. He provided intelligence on troop movements.

On the 20th, 1,400 Japs were ordered to occupy the Lichiadine area to guard the railroad against our operations and to find our Hq if possible. To divert these troops, our men, in conjunction with Tsia Lee's guerillas, ambushed a convoy south of Lingling, killing 32 Japs to our 9 casualties.

On the 26th we received a drop long waited for, since it brought Lt. ^{HARRISTON} Harriston to join our team. This was a valuable addition, for Lt. ^{HARRISTON} Harriston had just completed a five months mission himself so was well acquainted with field problems. Lt. ^{HARRISTON} Harriston brought us an 81 mm mortar which we began instructions on immediately. He also brought a much needed radio. This same day we heard of the decapitation of Cline, member of Team Ermine. That night we had 12 dead prisoners.

Except for the news of Cline's death, the day was encouraging. We reported to Air Corps a large Jap motor pool at ERH Tang containing 200 trucks at times. There was also the conference of group commanders for the discussion of policy. General Chiang knew our policy of accelerated actions and freely ordered more results. All were informed of our next demo operation and were very enthusiastic. Being able to witness the drop also built up their spirits in addition to the fact that we asked them for special men to be sent to help form our long awaited ambush team. Their cooperation was instantaneous and instead of 125 men we received 240.

On the 28th, our men began to arrive for supplies for our demo job that was to extend from Hengyang to Tungan. At this time we also asked for the use of L-5 planes to act as a personal air force for Elephant on our new strip which was completed the next day. Needless to say, there was no air force available for Elephant.

On the 31st, our coolies and soldiers from Formen Headquarters brought in a small quantity of TNT. That latter saved our operation from being a complete

failure. At this time 80 more demo men were graduated. The next day, much to our chagrin, we cancelled our large operation and substituted a minute one in its place. Men were sent to cut the rail between Lichiapine and Tonean and also telephone lines. We also operated the same way from Hungchise to Hengyang. For this operations diversion we wired Maj. Camp if he could coordinate an attack in his area with ours. He arranged his mission for the night of the 5th. Both were successful and left the Japs confused as to locations and numbers of Americans involved. Results of our job were 40 rails and 20 telephone line cuts between Lichiapine and Tungan and also 81 rails and 20 telephone line cuts and a small bridge blown 15 kilos southwest of Hengyang. Telephone lines were cut by throwing 4 strands of primacord over wire. These strands were taped together and detonated with a time pencil and cap; one end was weighted and a small cord attached to the other for the purpose of placing the device.

On the 1st, our men south of Lingling killed 12 Japs. On the 2nd, we received what we had been waiting two months for, 70 carbines and .03 and a VHF radio. Unfortunately a typical OSS blunder was apparent, for the radio had been dropped incomplete. Every time thereafter that we moved, that worthless 500 lb radio our feelings toward the signal man in charge of the radio shipment were more than bitter. In spite of this error our month was apparent in its possibilities, even though we were still lacking in critical items of demo, such as safety fuse and time pencils. The number of men trained and the wide dispersion of these operating areas was indicative of the possibility of large scale work. To aid this theory we graduated 20 men from Lingling and 20 from Kiyang on demo and sabotage. They were given orders, equipment and sent back.

Two more air corps targets concerning anti aircraft guns and the location of Jap Maj General Chwan Kou at Lichiaping. In addition to these, we sent in only one more air target which was the highway river bridge nearing completion at Kiyang.

On the 1st, a skirmish took place south of Wenmingpu and eight Japs were killed and four wounded. Our intelligence showed that this was the first move to locate our new Headquarters. Again on the 4th, contact was made at the same place, eight more were killed and ten wounded, two prisoners were taken. After questioning them our suspicions were confirmed. The enemy was looking for us. The Wenminepu area was becoming relatively active, so next day we sent one half of our new weapons with our graduating class of 110 men there. These men arrived just in time, for on the 7th another battle ensued, resulting in 32 Jap casualties and eight wounded. Our losses were nine and five.

At this time we took in our last class for the specialized team we had so long hoped to have. While they were in training, our agents were looking for possible operating locations for the VHF along the highway. These men informed us that the enemy troops were now rolling up the telephone lines. This was proof that operations would not exist any great length of time in this area. For this reason we believed one last rail job would be beneficial in disrupting their retreat. This was planned for the 11th and the results were profitable with 100 cuts and one engine being derailed 3 miles south of Lichiapine. The rails were destroyed in the same bounds as our first job, which by this time was operating again.

On the 8th, we received word that our sabotage embryo was at last blossoming. Between the 1st and 5th, ten trucks were cackluded at Lingling by us and in addition, many trucks were breaking down along the highway as a result of our work.

On the 9th, our unit at Kiyang blew and burned a Jap barracks near our old headquarters, killing three Japs and wounding four. On the 11th, 2 more trucks were blown in Lichiaping. That same night, a small unit Headquarters was blown and burned 3 miles north east of Kiyang. Four Japs were killed and seven wounded. Next night, one mile of telephone wire was blown at Niao Shan Chang. One small bridge, called the Hunan Bridge, was blwon 6 kilos east of Lichiaping, also one truck was destroyed in this area, with the two Jap drivers killed. Two more trucks were blown on the Highway on the right of the Wu Kai River. Ten miles northeast of Lingling a small gas dump was burned, destroying 12 barrels of gas and two store houses. After this I ceased recording operations of sabotage, but I am definitely certain that over 20 more trucks were destroyed.

In regards to our special ambush instructed class, they were graduated on the 7th and sent immediately to the Wenminpu area where the Japs had called for reinforcements of 300 from Kiyang and an undetermined number from Paoching. On the 9th, another engagement occurred in which 52 Japs were killed and 28 wounded. We lost 18 men and had 4 wounded. Our 81mm mortar was now being used.

It was our plan to join the battle on the morning of the 10th but we received orders that Americans were to cease operations. This in no way disappointed us. Although we ceased operations, it was impossible for our men to cease fighting for the Japs were still fighting and pillaging the people. For this reason I know it is safe to say that over 150 more Japs were killed by our men before hostilities finally ceased.

On the 12th after operations ceased, Lt. Pelfrey suffered from an appendicitis attack and became seriously ill. Capt. Robert Wilson of the Medical Corps volunteered and jumped in to attend him. Only through Capt. Wilson's skill was Lt. Pelfrey's life saved. On the 17th he was evacuated from a virtually impossible mud soaked field by Sgt. Bill Harper of the 19th Liaison Squadron in his L-5 plane. To the courage and ability of these two men we express our appreciation.

Any omissions or mistakes I have made in this report I did unintentionally because keeping accurate records was rather difficult.

WALTER C. HANNA
Captain, FA
Commanding Team Elephant

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First I wish to express my appreciation to members on the team for splendid cooperation and loyalty. They worked diligently and took personal interest in each assignment. Their spirit was incredible and actions superior. It was a privilege to command such a group.

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For the excellent cooperation we received from our direct Headquarters at Chihkiang, in which S.O. operations were under the command of Maj. John Summers, our team is deeply appreciative.

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We are also indebted to General Chiang Fu Sent for his all-out assistance in fulfilling our desires to carry out the mission assigned to us. In no way could he have been more cooperative and considerate.

* * * * *

Special credit goes to Communications for they were entirely satisfactory. Base (WLUK) personnel did a splendid job of handling traffic and showed us every consideration possible. Their efforts, more often than not, pass by unnoticed and never receive praise or thanks they so justly deserve.

The radio 694-C, our main set proved to be the best Army radio for our operations under all conditions.

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To the men who flew our supplies and to those who assisted in the drops we owe unlimited thanks and respect.

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WALTER C. HANNA
Captain, FA
Commanding Team Elephant